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The Unbearable Anxiety of Being: Ideological Fantasies of British Muslims 
beyond the Politics of Security 
 
Abstract 
Since the advent of the 'War on Terror' British Muslims have been designated as 
a source of anxiety by politicians, journalists and publics alike. Fears that began 
over terrorism have extended to the opening of Islamic faith schools, the 
meaning of clothing and halal slaughter. Critical scholarship that engages with 
these developments in the fields of politics and international relations tends to 
view them through paradigms of (in)security. Whilst these contributions have 
been helpful in understanding the construction of a Muslim 'problem', this article 
demonstrates how the array of issues incorporated by this problem exceeds the 
politics of security. 
The article develops an original conceptual and analytic framework, drawing 
upon Slavoj Žižek's Lacanian theory of ideology, to argue that political and 
media ‘scandals’ about  what an imagined 'Muslim community' gets up to are 
best understood as ideological fantasies. Through analysis of three case studies, 
we show that these fantasies are mobilised to suture traumatic gaps and conceal 
contradictions in wider social practices around sexual abuse, education, and food 
production. We show how the unremitting focus on myriad aspects of British 
Muslims’ imagined lives is symptomatic of what Žižek calls an ‘unbearable 
anxiety’. Islamophobic ideological fantasies summon a ‘conceptual Muslim’ 
figure as a means of preventing confrontation with the Lacanian ‘Real’: 
antagonistic and anxiety-inducing structures and practices underpinning British 
society, of which we do not speak. 
  
 3  
 
‘I wanted to consider what divides communities and gives rise to anxiety’ 
Dame Louise Casey (2016)1  
The Casey Review: A review into opportunity and integration 
 
‘What will we do about The Muslim Problem then?’ 
Trevor Kavanagh (2017)2 
The Sun 
1. Introduction 
On 7th May 2014, Britain’s highest circulation newspaper, the Sun, led with a story that 
restaurant chain Pizza Express was using halal meat without the knowledge of customers (Jones, 
2014). The story came in the wake of similar revelations in April 2014, that fast-food chain Subway 
was selling halal meat in 185 of its shops ‘in an effort to please’ Muslims (Poulter, 2014). Similar 
tales have been in circulation in the press regarding the creeping infiltration of halal meat into 
schools, hospitals, prisons and even, as the Daily Mail notes with disdain, pubs (Penman, 2010).  
This ‘media scandal’ (Lull and Hinerman, 1997) underscores wider fears about an Islamic 
‘takeover’ of Britain. Colin Hart of the Christian Institute, describes the prevalence of halal meat 
as the ‘Islamification of food’ (Poulter et al, 2014), hinting at a more deep-seated anxiety about the 
spread of the Muslim ‘contagion’ or an ‘enemy within’ (Warsi, 2017). The takeover, spread, or 
infiltration of Britain by Muslims is also represented as occurring without the knowledge or 
consent of the population, as a conspiracy. Stephen Evans of the National Secular Society confirms 
this: ‘Unsuspecting members of the public are routinely being duped into buying meat from 
religious slaughter methods’ (Jones, 2014). This anxiety over secret Muslim activity reveals a 
compulsion on the part of much of the national news media to link this social group to a whole 
set of activities around which there is significant social tension. These do not just include the 
obvious topics of terrorism and ‘radicalisation’ but also paedophilia, benefits fraud, female genital 
mutilation, illegal immigration, electoral fraud, gender-based violence, faith schools and dress 
codes. The casting of the figure of the Muslim in these diverse narratives as deviant, depraved or 
barbaric calls for a fresh look at how and why this development has occurred. Existing critical 
                                                          
1  The Casey Review was commissioned by government to investigate ‘opportunity and integration’ in the UK 
yet in the 199-page report, Muslims, Islam and ‘Islamism’ are mentioned 349 times, by contrast to just 35 
mentions of Christians and Christianity, and 23 mentions of Jewish people and Judaism. 
2  Kavanagh is a former Political Editor, and now a columnist, at the Sun. Condemnation of this article for 
parallels with Hitler’s ‘Jewish Problem’ and ‘final solution’ led the newspaper to remove the capital letters 
from ‘The’ and ‘Problem’ in the online version. An IPSO investigation found that the article ‘was capable of 
causing serious offence, given [...] the rhetoric preceding the Holocaust’ but did not breach its Editors’ Code. 
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accounts of the construction of the figure of the Muslim in post-9/11 international relations (IR) 
scholarship has drawn upon securitisation theory, the ‘suspect communities’ thesis and 
governmentality approaches. These contributions have been crucial in highlighting the processes 
of marking out and designating Muslims as objects of (in)security, but have been unable to capture 
the more excessive, ‘fantasmatic’ elements of these efforts. 
This article draws upon psychoanalytic and social theory to demonstrate how the ‘conceptual 
Muslim’ is not simply a source of societal anxiety in Britain today, but is also constructed to manage 
a range of societal anxieties. Inspired by Slavoj Žižek’s Lacanian understanding of ideology, we 
show how British society fantasises about Muslims to avoid confrontation with contradictory and 
upsetting aspects of our social ‘Real’. Where pressing political problems rear their head, such as 
the large-scale sexual exploitation of women and girls, the implications of neoliberal educational 
reform, or the industrial production of meat, the conceptual Muslim is invoked as a means of 
bypassing critical societal self-reflection. Anxiety over these problems is channelled through the 
figure of the conceptual Muslim who bears the blame for society’s ills and this tendency concretely 
forestalls the possibility for radical political change focused on challenging patriarchy, class 
inequality and anthroparchy. 
The focus of our analysis is on media coverage of three cases in particular: ‘Muslim rape gangs’, 
the ‘Trojan Horse’ school controversy and the halal meat scandal. The aim of the analysis is to 
uncover the fundamentally fantasmatic quality of the Muslim ‘problem’ in Britain today. The article 
first constructs a conceptual and analytic framework through Žižek’s Lacanian theory of ideology 
as a tool or heuristic to demonstrate how scholars can conceptualise the figure of the Muslim 
‘other’ as serving multiple political functions beyond the paradigm of security. The second part of 
the article explores the three exemplar media scandals set out above and demonstrates how they 
are united not by the actual practices of British Muslims, but by the fantasmatic function they serve 
in managing societal anxieties about generalised but unspeakable practices. While British Muslims 
are represented as deviants in relation to a range of issues, societal fantasies about secretive and 
deviant minority practices are, as our analysis demonstrates, really a means of uncritically 
addressing anxieties over the society we are collectively (re)producing. 
2. A conceptual-analytic framework for ideology-critique 
2.1 Why ideology? Moving beyond the security paradigm  
There is an extant literature in the fields of politics and international relations that 
addresses social policy and media constructions of Muslims in the West through the conceptual 
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lenses of ‘securitisation’ (Cesari, 2009; Brown, 2010; Hussain and Bagguley, 2012; Bosco, 2014; 
Fox and Akababa, 2015), ‘suspect communities’ (Pantazis and Pemberton, 2009; Choudhary and 
Fenwick, 2011; Hickman et al., 2011; Awan, 2012; HC Nikels et al, 2012; Kundnani, 2014), and 
‘governmentality’ (Aradau and van Munster, 2007; Birt, 2011; de Goede, 2008; de Goede and 
Simons, 2012; Heath-Kelly, 2013; O’Toole, 2016). Each of these lenses offers something useful, 
but each also remains tied to the paradigm of security as its key reference point. Distinct concerns 
over schools, food, and sexual abuse, among other things, have been articulated through a series 
of media scandals, and while each is partly represented as overlapping with security concerns 
around terrorism and ‘radicalisation’, none is confined to this topic. We therefore need a 
conceptual and analytic framework that can speak to the more pervasive nature of anxieties about 
Muslims.  
This article shows that the concept of ideology - specifically the Lacanian version 
developed by Slavoj Žižek - can provide such a framework. In the midst of the liberal triumphalism 
of the early post-Cold War era, Žižek added his voice to attempts to resuscitate the concept of 
ideology, noting that the ‘idea of the possible end of ideology is an ideological idea par excellence’ 
(2008: xxiv). In addition to his first major work published in English, The Sublime Object of Ideology 
(1989), Žižek penned a series of shorter interventions that were concerned with retrieving the 
concept of ideology and re-asserting its pertinence at a time when many were claiming that it had 
become a defunct or irrelevant category. Žižek’s Lacanian concept of ideology provides a way of 
seeing policy and media representations of an imagined ‘Muslim community’ as a confluence of 
fantasies and anxieties mobilised in the service of specific power relations and political strategies, 
which, we argue, makes for a deeper understanding of the wide range of ‘scandals’ relating to 
British Muslims, and the prominence accorded to these in our public sphere.  
 Muslims are singled out for exceptional, sustained, multi-faceted and intensive vilification 
(Alexander, 2017: 14). While critical security theory can contribute to explaining some aspects of 
this problem, there are important elements that are not accounted for. How has the figure of the 
Muslim become the pre-eminent ‘monster’ in our news media, across such a wide spectrum of 
issues? What sort of investment do we have as a society in the existence and threat of this monster 
that renders it so ubiquitous and anxiety-inducing? To answer these questions, it is useful to engage 
in a form of ideology-critique.  
2.2 Which ideology? Beyond truth and falsehood 
The Marxian concept of ideology has faced compelling challenges from within the critical 
tradition of social theory itself. Poststructuralist criticism has been articulated through a critique 
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of claims to ‘truth’ and ‘falsehood’ ostensibly implied in the concept of ideology, and a consequent 
imagined ability to ‘step outside of discourse’ on the part of practitioners of ideology-critique. 
Today, in the academic fields of politics and international relations, we find ideology counter-
posed to Foucault’s concept of ‘governmentality’ in the form of a vertical analogy wherein the 
former functions ‘top-down’ while the latter acts from the ‘bottom-up’ (Springer, 2012: 133). 
Contemporary Foucauldian scholarship rejects ‘mere’ ideology as inadequate in explaining the 
complex modalities and generative capacities of power in the (post)modern world (for example: 
Rose, 1993; Vrasti, 2011). 
How can we salvage the concept of ideology from this powerful critique? Žižek has striven 
to actively dissociate it from the ‘representationalist’ paradigm, according to which ideology is 
simply falsehood obscuring from view the ‘truth’ of the exploitation and inequality intrinsic to 
capitalism (Žižek, 1994: 7). Instead, Žižek proposes a concept of ideology as a ‘generative matrix 
that regulates the relationship between visible and non-visible, between imaginable and non-
imaginable, as well as changes in this relationship’ (1994: 1). Such a matrix is not imposed ‘top-
down’, but consists in the basic interpretive frameworks, the ways of seeing (Berger, 1972), that 
we engage in our everyday lives. Ideology saturates everyday culture and communication, from 
film, literature, music and art to management practices and workplace training. We produce it 
ourselves, it belongs to us.  
Žižek is not alone in conceptualising ideology in a more spontaneous, less 
representationalist, way. Stuart Hall, for example, rejects conceptualisations of ideology as the top-
down imposition of an illusion or ‘some simple, all-or-nothing distinction between the True and 
the False’ (Hall, 1986: 39) - in favour of a sensitivity to the diffusion of ideology in social 
constellations, its operation in ‘logics’ and discourses, and in what Gramsci called ‘common sense’. 
We agree with Hall that ‘[i]deas only become effective if they do, in the end, connect with a 
particular constellation of social forces’ (ibid.: 42). But, as our analysis demonstrates, whereas Hall 
and others remain skeptical about psychoanalytic concepts, Žižek’s reading of the concept of 
ideology through Lacanian psychoanalytic theory is particularly insightful. 
In the The Pervert’s Guide to Ideology (2013), Žižek uses the cult classic 1980s film They Live! 
to summarise his approach. The protagonist stumbles upon a box of sunglasses developed by a 
clandestine resistance movement who are struggling against ‘bodysnatcher’ aliens which, without 
the sunglasses, appear as ordinary people, and occupy all positions of political-economic power. 
When one dons the glasses, one sees through the illusion – the false consciousness – these aliens 
are broadcasting globally. Billboards, magazines, even dollar bills appear as they ‘really’ are; blank 
and grey, with simple and brutal injunctions inscribed onto them: ‘OBEY AND CONFORM’, 
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‘MARRY AND REPRODUCE’. They Live! thus provides a crucial insight into to the dynamics of 
ideology: 
According to our common sense, we think that ideology is something blurring, confusing 
our ‘straight’ view. [In this view] ideology should be [understood as the] glasses, which distort 
our view, and the critique of ideology should be the opposite, like you take off the glasses so 
you can finally see the way things really are. This, precisely – and here the pessimism of the 
film, of They Live!, is well justified – this, precisely is the ultimate illusion. Ideology is not 
simply imposed on ourselves. Ideology is our spontaneous relationship to our social world, 
how we perceive each meaning, and so on and so on. We, in a way, enjoy our ideology! (Žižek, 
2013). 
Ideology is something that societies buy into (emotionally as much as materially) and 
reproduce as the experience of a cohesive social totality, or what Mandelbaum (2016) has called 
‘the congruency fantasy’ with respect to ‘the discursive relations between state, nation and society 
in modernity’. ‘In the predominant Marxist perspective’, as Žižek puts it, ‘the ideological gaze is a 
partial gaze overlooking the totality of social relations, whereas in the Lacanian perspective ideology 
rather designates a totality set on effacing the traces of its own possibility’ (Žižek, 1989: 50). The concept 
of ideology need not, therefore, ‘always stand in virtual opposition to something else which is 
supposed to count as truth’ (Foucault, 1984: 60), but is rather constitutive of ‘truths’ as we 
experience them: 
Ideology is thus not necessarily ‘false’: as to its positive content, it can be ‘true’, quite accurate, 
since what really matters is not the asserted content as such but the way this content is related to the 
subjective position implied by its own process of enunciation (Žižek, 1994: 8). 
Thinking our problem through ideology in this sense therefore involves asking the 
questions: how do all of these stories around Islam and Muslims in 21st century Britain function 
for us? Why, as a society, are we telling ourselves these stories about Muslims through our news 
media and national political conversation?  
2.3 Fantasy and anxiety: Developing and applying Žižek’s Lacanian conceptualisation of 
ideology 
Žižek’s conceptualisation of ideology rests upon a Lacanian theory of the subject. As such, 
two aspects of Lacan’s psychoanalytic theory are especially important to understanding how the 
social construction of British Muslims can be conceived of as ‘ideological’: fantasy, and anxiety. 
These strands of Lacanian theory are intimately interrelated to the point of imbrication in his 
theorisation of the subject (Lacan, 2014), and we do not seek to describe each as a discrete 
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phenomenon; to do so would be to fundamentally misunderstand both Lacan and Žižek. Nor do 
we offer a ‘doctrinaire’ account of Žižek’s Lacanian conceptualisation of ideology. Instead, we 
draw upon both thinkers, and others, to develop our own conceptual-analytic framework for 
ideology-critique.  
There have been important interventions that have mobilised Lacanian psychoanalytic 
concepts in IR (Eklundh, Zevnik and Guittet; 2017; Epstein 2011; Mandelbaum, 2016; Zevnik 
2017a; 2017b). However, these interventions do not explicitly engage with the concept of ideology, 
which yields fresh critical insight by attending to the ways in which power relations and political 
strategies are mobilised. Through discussions of the fantasy of congruence, Mandelbaum argues 
‘possibilities of national/social congruency require an other, an empty signifier of sorts (e.g. the 
foreigner, the migrant, Islam and so on)’ (2016: 191). This article engages in an analysis of an 
‘other’, the conceptual Muslim, and its ideological functions in concrete political struggles beyond 
security.  
The concepts of fantasy and anxiety are common to the Freudian and Kleinian 
psychoanalytic traditions that pre-date Lacan. But it is in Lacan’s Seminar X that the two concepts 
become thoroughly imbricated, with fantasies acting to manage anxieties generated by the 
‘constitutive lack’ at the core of the subject (Lacan, 2014: 3; Ormrod, 2014: 116). Fantasmatic 
narratives about others allow us to conceal or escape deadlocks and antagonisms about ourselves, 
and in this sense fantasy is crucial to ideology. Specifically, while ‘reality’ is never directly 
experienced, but always-already symbolised, that symbolisation is always incomplete. The ‘Real’ (in 
the Lacanian sense, aspects of social reality that remain non-symbolised) thus reasserts itself in the 
form of ‘spectral apparitions’ (Žižek, 2005: 262). These fantasmatic spectres serve to ‘fill up the 
hole of the Real’ (Ibid.), or to manage our anxieties about societal antagonisms. In this sense, 
anxiety plays a dual role in ideology - it is both cause and effect. We are anxious about social 
contradictions of which we do not speak and then, when they erupt into the symbolic realm, we 
are encouraged to focus instead on spectral apparitions which are, in turn, cues to (actionable) 
anxiety. 
In this engagement with the nomenclature of Lacanian psychoanalysis we risk losing track 
of the concept of ideology itself. It is therefore important to emphasise that Žižek’s Lacanian 
reconstruction of the concept is very much within that ‘critical’ tradition defined by John 
Thompson wherein ideology is understood as ‘meaning in the service of power’ (1990: 7). For Žižek too 
ideology is often realised and communicated textually or linguistically. A Lacanian concept of 
ideology does not contradict the claim of media discourse theorists and analysts like Roger Fowler 
that ‘[a]nything that is said or written about the world is articulated from a particular ideological 
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position: language is not a clear window but a refracting, structuring, medium’ (1991: 10) and that 
consequently ideology ‘literally constructs the news, as it is written about’ (ibid.: 24). This is what 
Žižek means when he says that ‘facts never ‘speak for themselves’ but are always made to speak 
by a network of discursive devices’. Particular media representations are ideological to the extent 
that they serve the interests of maintaining existing social orders and forestall radical social change. 
Such representations are not necessarily ‘consciously’ produced by a manipulative ruling class 
however, but may result from what Jessop (2008) calls ‘strategic selectivity’, whereby policies, 
discourses and practices that favour and reproduce the social status quo are more likely to prevail. 
This model does not involve a spurious extrapolation from the ‘individual’ level of 
psychology to the societal level. In Lacanian psychoanalysis, unlike dominant strains of social 
psychology today, no such methodological individualism obtains. In the Lacanian view (which 
begins from a ‘constitutive lack’ at the core of the subject), the psychological is always-already 
social, there is no abstract ‘individual’; one of many parallels with Marx (for example: Marx, 1973: 
84). In The Parallax View Žižek rebuts the level of analysis objection in detail: 
 
The focus of psychoanalysis resides elsewhere: the Social, the field of social practices and 
socially held beliefs, is not simply on a different level from individual experience, but 
something to which the individual himself has to relate … to experience as an order which 
is minimally - reified, externalized. The problem, therefore, is not - how to jump from the 
individual to the social level (Žižek, 2006: 6).  
 
This differs crucially from ‘cognitive’ psychological models of ideology too. Van Dijk, for 
instance, explicitly rejects the critical concept of ideology employed by scholars like Thompson for 
being ‘exclusively inspired by the social sciences’ (van Dijk, 2006: 21) and instead draws upon 
cognitive psychology in an effort to avoid focusing too strongly on ‘discursive and social 
dimensions’ (van Dijk, 1998: 21). This methodologically individualist psychological framing of 
ideology is almost diametrically opposed to Žižek’s Lacanian model. 
To conceptualise ideology as meaning in the service of power, and as realised in the 
interplay between anxiety and fantasy is a productive strategy as our analysis will demonstrate. It 
is also an approach that has not, as yet, been brought to bear on the research problem at stake in 
this investigation: the mediatised social construction of British Muslims beyond the politics of 
security.   
2.4 Ideology-critique and the unbearable anxiety of the ‘conceptual Muslim’ 
 10  
 
The value added to our analysis by placing Žižek’s Lacanian concept of ideology at the 
centre of our conceptual-analytic framework is prefigured by Žižek’s own discussion of Nazi 
ideology, the fantasy of the ‘conceptual Jew’ and a ‘Jewish plot’. He argues that in Nazi ideology 
‘the Jew is like the maternal phallus: there is no such thing in reality, yet for that very reason its 
phantom-like, spectral presence gives rise to an unbearable anxiety’ (Žižek, 2005: 258) [emphasis 
added]. It is the very gap between the ‘empirical’ Jew, actual Jewish people and their everyday lives, 
and the ‘conceptual’ Jew-as-monster, the omnipotent and conniving figure of the Jew, which 
reinforces the fantasy of the latter. Nazi ideology consisted partly in fantasies about what the 
monstrous ‘conceptual Jew’ got up to behind closed doors. 
Such fantasies need not be limited to either Nazi ideology or the ‘conceptual Jew’. Žižek 
suggests that while general social ‘intolerance’ to ‘foreigners’ takes the form of complaints about 
‘their’ loud voices, strange food, ugly clothing, or bad smell, such factors are found to be no more 
than ‘indicators of a more radical strangeness’, an ‘unfathomable je ne sais quoi’ (2005: 256). The 
role that these fantasies ‘about the other’s political and/or sexual omnipotence, about ‘their’ 
strange sexual practices, about their secret hypnotic powers’ (Ibid.) play in ideological terms is their 
covering of the unarticulated or non-symbolised Real. These are the ‘spectral apparitions’ to which 
Žižek refers. 
Žižek’s Lacanian concept of ideology captures some of the ways that psychoanalytic 
categories, including fantasy and anxiety figure in political and social processes and events, and 
allows us to think of ideology as filling the gaps and voids in our social world to shore up our 
fragile identities. Consequently, Žižek argues that: 
[one] mode of the critique of ideology that corresponds to this notion is that of the symptomal 
reading: the aim […] is to discern the unavowed bias of the official text via its ruptures, blanks 
and slips (1994). 
In response to Donald Rumsfeld’s (in)famous ‘known knowns’ speech on Iraq, Žižek put 
it another way. He noted that what Rumsfeld neglects to mention are ‘unknown knows’ – things 
we don’t know that we know (Žižek, 2006). This disavowed knowledge relates to the domain of 
the Real; the parts of reality that remain non-symbolised. The aim of a symptomal reading is 
therefore to attempt to describe the function of a given ‘spectre’ or fantasy in relation to this 
disavowed knowledge or non-symbolised reality. The purpose of our ideology-critique is thus to 
carry out a symptomal reading that reveals powerful antagonisms underpinning and maintaining 
our social orders. Ideological representations involve a fantasy of facticity and empirical clarity 
with regard to the spectre: 
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One of the fundamental stratagems of ideology is the reference to some self-evidence – ‘Look, 
you can see for yourself how things are!’. ‘Let the facts speak for themselves’ is perhaps the 
arch-statement of ideology – the point being, precisely, that facts never ‘speak for themselves’ 
but are always made to speak by a network of discursive devices (Žižek, 1994: 11). 
The critique of ideology thus consists in an attempt to reconnect fantasmatic spectres to 
the ruptured Real. Rather than revealing some ‘deeper’ reality that is concealed by ideological 
illusion or falsehood, this method of ideology-critique is about highlighting the functions of 
particular powerful fantasies in a symbolic order where fantasising itself is inescapable. The point 
is to undermine fantasmatic narratives that claim that ‘the facts speak for themselves’: 
 
When a racist Englishman says ‘There are too many Pakistanis on our streets!’, how – from 
what place – does he ‘see’ this – that is, how is his symbolic space structured so that he can 
perceive the fact of a Pakistani strolling along a London street as a disturbing surplus? That 
is to say, here one must bear in mind Lacan’s motto that nothing is lacking in the real: every 
perception of a lack or a surplus (‘not enough of this’, ‘too much of that’) always involves a 
symbolic universe (Ibid.). 
Milan Kundera’s novel famously proposes an ‘unbearable lightness of being’ in 
contradistinction to the heaviness of Nietzsche’s ‘eternal return’ (Kundera, 1984; Nietzsche, 2000). 
We can think of the ‘unbearable anxiety’ generated by the figure of the Muslim as precisely an 
instantiation of the eternal return of the ideological other; a fantasised ‘conceptual’ other who plots 
against and undermines our social whole. But the conceptual Muslim cannot really spoil our happy 
social whole, since it is never there in the first place. Our society is riven with difference and 
antagonism, with competing fantasies and aspirations. Instead, this figure, which ‘appears as the 
hindrance to society’s full identity with itself’ turns out to be its ‘positive condition’. In other words, 
we can here substitute a ‘conceptual Muslim’ for the ‘conceptual Jew’ in Žižek’s analysis, such that: 
‘by transposing onto the [Muslim] the role of the foreign body which introduces in the social 
organism disintegration and antagonism, the fantasy-image of society qua consistent, harmonious 
whole is rendered possible’ (1992: 104). The more tension is ratcheted up in contemporary Britain, 
through ‘austerity’ and inequality, the rise of the far right, the split between ‘Leavers’ and 
‘Remainers’ in the wake of the 2016 referendum on EU membership, and a spike in hate crimes 
against minority groups, the figure of the Muslim becomes increasingly important in managing our 
political-economic neuroses. Islamophobic depictions of Muslims in British government and 
media can be considered ideological, in this sense. 
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Ideological fantasies are thus the narratives by means of which we avoid confrontation with 
the Lacanian ‘Real’ of political and economic power: the unarticulated and contradictory structures 
and practices that underpin our social order. These fantasies intensify when that Real is close to 
‘erupting’ into visibility. This differs from an ‘ideology as illusion’ conceptual model in that the 
fantasies are not necessarily ‘false’ in the content of their narratives about particular social events, 
actors and processes, but are rather a means of avoiding confrontation with the ways in which the 
same problems represented as ‘deviant’ by a fantasy narrative may in fact be at the heart of ‘normal’ 
life - an anxiety-inducing prospect indeed. In the second half of this article, we turn to three media 
scandal case studies in relation to British Muslims. Our aim here is to show how Žižek’s Lacanian 
reconstruction of the concept of ideology, and this notion of the ‘conceptual Muslim’ can be 
brought to bear to develop original insights into the political power dynamics of racialised othering 
and the demonisation of Muslim minorities, beyond the politics of security. 
3. The Unbearable Anxiety of Being: child sexual abuse, education and food 
Below we explore concrete examples demonstrating the ‘spectral apparition’ of the 
conceptual Muslim in three British media scandals. The analysis of each fantasy is structured in 
two parts; the first examines the construction of the fantasy and second unpicks its ideological 
functions. An analysis of these fantasies shows the conceptual Muslim to be both purveyor and 
manager of anxieties, enmeshed in broader political struggles, strategies and relations of power.  
3.1 ‘Muslamic ray guns’: Muslim sexuality and paedophilia 
Constructing the fantasy  
The concept of the ‘Muslim rape gang’ went viral in 2011 through an interview with an 
English Defence League member. Asked why he is marching, he says ‘cos I want Britain to be 
about British’, followed by a series of incoherent comments about ‘the Muslamic infidel’ who is 
‘trying to put their law’, and ‘their Iraqi law’, ‘down on us’. He adds what sounds like ‘you’ve got 
Muslamic ray guns’. But this incoherent explanation is important, since, despite its surface level 
absurdity, there is something intelligible about it. The ‘Muslamic ray guns’ comment was significant 
because it was clear that he was really trying to say ‘Muslim rape gangs’. That such a disturbing 
comment appears in such a surreal form is telling. As inarticulate and intoxicated as the man 
appears, he is attempting to describe a ‘Muslim plot’, ranging from the imposition of Sharia law in 
parts of Britain to the infamous ‘rape gangs’. His comments can be read as a symptom (Zevnik, 
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2017) of a wider complex of anxiety and fantasy regarding the sexually monstrous conceptual 
Muslim.  
In 2012, the cabinet minister and Labour MP Jack Straw, claimed that men from the 
Pakistani community were deliberately ‘grooming’ white girls in order to form sexual relations with 
them (Prince, 2012). He argued that these men saw white girls as ‘easy meat’ (ibid). Since 2012, 
there have been a number of cases involving Muslim men exploiting and raping young girls. In 
addition to Rochdale, there have been prosecutions in Oxford, Birmingham, Derby and High 
Wycombe (BBC, 2014). Explanations for these incidents of systematic sexual abuse has been 
directly linked to religion, race and misogyny (Tufail, 2015). Tory MP Kris Hopkins claimed that 
white girls are considered ‘available’ by Muslim men because they do not dress modestly and 
Baroness Warsi said they were seen as ‘fair game’ (Huffington Post, 2012). Labour’s shadow 
Equalities Minister Sarah Champion resigned in 2017 after arguing ‘Britain has a problem with 
British Pakistani men raping and exploiting white girls’ in the Sun.  
The link between religion, race and misogyny is made clear in these narratives: Muslim 
men rape because of their ethnic and religious identity. Allison Pearson sums this up, ‘Leaders of the 
Pakistani Muslim community – essentially a Victorian society that has landed like Doctor Who’s 
Tardis on a liberal, permissive planet it despises – are at pains to deny that the grooming gangs 
behaviour has anything to do with ethnic origin or contemptible attitudes towards women’ 
(Pearson, 2013). The empirically observable fact of some groups of predominantly Muslim men 
sexually abusing mostly white, non-Muslim girls is thus ‘made to speak’, to borrow Žižek’s turn of 
phrase, to a broader fantasy about British Muslims as a culturally deviant minority with sinister 
designs on ‘our’ (white, non-Muslim men’s) women and children. 
 
The ideological functions of ‘Muslim rape gangs’ fantasy 
Stories of the serial historic sexual abuse have proliferated since the death of the television 
presenter Jimmy Savile in 2011. Savile abused up to 500 children he encountered through his 
television work and charitable visits to hospitals and schools (BBC, 2014). The investigation into 
Savile’s activities also triggered the Metropolitan Police’s ‘Operation Yewtree’, investigating other 
well-known figures including the DJ Dave Lee Travis, children’s television presenter Rolf Harris 
and publicist Max Clifford. Media reaction to these cases varied. In the case of Savile, shock was 
expressed by many members of the press despite the fact these allegations were known to many 
who worked with him (Davies, 2012). But explanations for the actions of these men centred on 
their celebrity status at the BBC, their wealth, and the sexual permissiveness of the time (Sillito, 
2016; Boyle, 2016; Robertson, 2013).  
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Deborah Orr offers a different take, ‘Look at the crimes that were committed by one man 
under cover of a dangerously misogynistic permissiveness, and wake up to the fact that this is 
exactly what all those tedious feminists mean when they talk of “rape culture”’ (Orr, 2012). But 
this ‘cultural’ narrative found little purchase in the media discussion, and was in any case not 
racialised (Orr is not suggesting that, for example, the ‘whiteness’ of perpetrators may be to blame). 
Most recently, fallout from allegations of abuse and rape levelled at American film producer 
Harvey Weinstein led to an outpouring of stories from women on social media about their 
experiences through the hashtag #metoo. These revelations extended to British politics too. 
Several MPs were ‘outed’ for sexual harassment and misconduct, with Defence Secretary Michael 
Fallon resigning his cabinet post over allegations against him (BBC, 2017).  
Juxtaposing these two examples of systematic sexual abuse reveals that one is represented 
as stemming from an excess of power and the other from degenerate religious or racial 
characteristics. Comparing the representation of sex offenders racialised as ‘Asian’, ‘Muslim’ or 
‘Pakistani’ versus those who were ‘white’, Tufail (2015) found racial and religious signifiers to be 
absent in coverage of the latter. White sex offenders were simply paedophiles whereas those 
racialised as ‘Muslim’ were doubly monstrous. There is, meanwhile, a strong historical precedent 
to describing Muslim masculinities and sexualities as perverted and dangerous (Battacharyya, 2008; 
Puar and Rai, 2002). The example of the Prophet Mohammed as a paedophile is a recurrent trope 
in far-right discourses on the threat posed by Muslim men (BBC, 2003) and the YouTube film 
Innocence of Muslims, which sparked international riots in 2012, also depicted Mohammed in this way 
(The Innocence of Muslims, 2012). Polygamy and the availability of virgins in heaven upon 
martyrdom are oft-cited examples of the apparent strangeness of Muslim sexual practices. 
From Savile to Weinstein to Westminster, systematic sexual abuse by the dominant, non-
Muslim white male culture is almost never described a result of ‘cultural’ or racial failings. Cultural 
misogyny appears as the sole property of Muslim men who are ‘known’ to be sexually deviant, and 
this is the ideological function of the ‘Muslim rape gangs’ fantasy. This fantasy obfuscates the wider 
problem of endemic child sexual exploitation and patriarchal violence at large in British society 
perpetrated overwhelmingly by (white, non-Muslim) men. In making child sexual exploitation the 
work of Muslim men, and bringing racial and religious identity into the causal explanation, 
‘Britishness’, and ‘British’ (white, non-Muslim) men are absolved. As bell hooks puts it: 
‘misogynistic attitudes tend to be portrayed by the dominant culture as always an expression of 
male deviance. In reality, they are part of a sexist continuum, necessary for the maintenance of 
patriarchal social order’ (hooks, 1994: 135). The Muslim rape gangs fantasy allows us to say ‘look, 
it’s the Pakistani, the Muslim’ and ‘in comparison, we, white British people are more civilised’. This 
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fantasy ensures the participation of many feminists in racist discourse about Muslim men (what 
Sara Farris (2017) calls femonationalism) and makes the transformational work of anti-racist 
feminists more difficult (Rashid, 2017).  
3.2 The ‘Trojan Horse’ of Birmingham: Muslim ‘plots’ in the state education system 
Constructing the fantasy 
In 2014, a letter containing details of a supposed Islamist plot to takeover 25 of 
Birmingham’s schools was sent to local educational authorities. Following the publication of the 
letter in news media, then Education Secretary Michael Gove ordered new Ofsted inspections of 
the schools concerned and appointed former head of counter-terrorism Peter Clarke to conduct a 
parallel inquiry (Travis, 2014). The result of the Ofsted inspections was to place three of the 
schools into special measures, despite the fact that two years previously two of them were rated 
‘outstanding’ by the same team. The schools were accused of not preparing children for life in 
modern Britain (Hiles, 2014), of failing to teach pupils about the dangers of extremism, and of 
weak teaching around sex and relationships (BBC, 2014). However, the schools were not accused 
of ‘radicalising’ Muslim schoolchildren. 
The letter that provoked the crisis is now considered a forgery but it was considered ‘real’ 
enough to warrant multiple inquires (Cook, 2014). There were ongoing problems at the schools 
regarding external speakers, the sacking of head teachers and the alienation of teaching staff (Ibid). 
But it did not matter whether there was a conspiracy because, as the Ofsted reports suggests, these 
academy status schools are already problematic for being run by Muslims. This view is reinforced 
by Gove’s move (later overturned) to ban those involved in the alleged ‘plot’ from teaching or 
becoming school governors (Gilligan, 2014). Published years earlier, Gove’s book Celsius 7/7 
contained a chapter entitled ‘The Trojan Horse’, where he argued Islamists are trying to take over 
Britain through attempts such as the one outlined in the now-debunked letter (Gove, 2006). The 
spectre of the conceptual Muslim was already in place for Gove as he drew comparisons between 
UK Muslims, Nazis and Communists in the scale of the threat they pose to ‘Western Civilisation’. 
Speculation over what was really going on in the schools abounded (Cook, 2014).  Charles 
Moore at the Daily Telegraph provides an example par excellence of the kind of fantasising Trojan 
Horse enabled: 
I wonder what we shall learn about the curriculum. Was evolutionary biology taught? Were 
any dancing or singing classes allowed? Were classes sexually segregated, with girls at the 
back, not allowed to ask questions? How were non-Muslim teachers, parents and pupils 
treated? Were there cultural exchange visits to Mecca and did these exclude non-Muslim 
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pupils? Were religious education classes on Christianity contrived specially for external 
visitors (Moore, 2014). 
 
The Daily Mail claimed that students were being taught ‘holy war’, for which their evidence 
was a Religious Education lesson that examined Jihad and Just War traditions (Clark et al., 2014). 
The Daily Express claims that governors from one school: 
 
were demanding religious assemblies and regular time out of class for worship and 
generally turned the headteacher’s life into a nightmare. Their intention was to remove 
Dave Peck but it is my view that it was their ultimate intention to take over the school and 
make it a Muslim faith school with a Muslim head (Wheeler, 2014). 
 
The evidence for these claims was generated through fevered chains of linked speculation based 
on what is already ‘known’ about Muslims, which was sufficient to enable and structure the Trojan 
Horse fantasy. 
 
The ideological functions of the ‘Trojan Horse’ fantasy 
Writing about the Trojan Horse scandal, John Holmwood and Therese O’Toole argue 
‘From the outset, it seemed to us there was no basis at all to this narrative’ (2017: 1). Five teachers 
who were accused of ‘professional misconduct’ by the Department for Education (DfE), had their 
cases brought to the National College for Teaching and Leadership (NCTL) but this was 
subsequently dropped. The NCTL accused government lawyers of ‘abuse of the process which is 
of such seriousness that it offends the panel’s sense of justice and propriety’. (Adams, 2017). 
Lifetime bans meted out to two further teachers by the DfE, were also overturned, with Judge 
Stephen Phillips accusing government lawyers of ‘serious procedural impropriety’ and highlighting 
‘considerable doubt as to the fairness’ of the proceedings (Adams, 2016). However, what is at stake 
in the analysis of Trojan Horse is not only its veracity. The fantasy functioned ideologically to 
conceal wider tensions and contradictions in neoliberal educational reform and its reproduction 
of racialised, classed and gendered hierarchies, which these reforms were ostensibly designed to 
address.  
As Education Secretary, Gove led wide-ranging changes, including significantly extending 
New Labour’s academies and free schools schemes, taking more schools outside the control of 
local education authorities. These schools receive funding directly from DfE and have control 
over staff, budgets, admissions and curricula (UK Government, 2015). According to the 
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government this is about raising educational standards in disadvantaged areas (Ibid). Over half of 
English schools are now academies. As Holmwood and O’Toole point out, ‘social inequalities had 
previously been argued to determine outcomes, the focus was shifted to aspirations (on the part of 
parents and communities) and expectations (of teachers) in order to drive up standards regardless of 
circumstances.’ (2017: 111). Simply put, schools and the communities in which they are embedded 
are responsibilised for overcoming structural disadvantages and fostering their own success. 
In 2012, Park View Academy had been judged ‘outstanding’ by Ofsted in spite of catering 
to some of the most disadvantaged students in Britain. After the scandal broke in 2014, it was 
judged ‘inadequate’ and put into special measures. The change in status hinged on the idea the 
school had an ‘Islamic ethos’ which was not preparing children for ‘life in modern Britain’, rather 
than on educational attainment or teaching quality (Holmwood and O’Toole, 2017: 152-3). Taken 
together, these concerns point to fears that schools runs by Muslims are susceptible to being 
‘Islamised’. But without the expansion of academies, the Trojan Horse scandal would not have 
been possible. Park View Academy was an example of the wrong race and class of people enabling 
the wrong kind of success through neoliberal educational reform.  
Christy Kulz (2017) has argued that a ‘successful’ academy is one which attracts white, 
middle-class children and parents whose aspirational values provide an example or ‘oasis’ to unruly 
(working class, racialised) ‘urban’ children. The colonisation of academies by white middle class 
families, to improve the chances of working class and BME children, reproduces the classed, raced 
and gendered structures they were ostensibly created to reform. The Trojan Horse scandal brought 
some of these tensions to light, but, as the example of Park View shows, the DfE and Gove were 
ultimately concerned with the ‘misuse’ of decentralised power by Muslims in the education system 
enabled by neoliberal reform. The fact this school was providing poor local students with the 
possibility of educational attainment was not relevant. What was at stake in the Trojan Horse 
Scandal was the reproduction of white middle class values and privilege, which was subverted by 
the successful running of Park View by Muslims.  
3.3 The ‘Halal Secret of Pizza Express’: Muslims and the British food industry 
Constructing the fantasy 
 In May 2014, The Sun ran a front page story relating to food, under the headline ‘HALAL 
SECRET OF PIZZA EXPRESS’, preceded by ‘After Subway ban on bacon…’ The use of halal 
meat by food outlets without labelling prompted newspapers to explain why this is problematic. 
The Sun wrote that ‘Islam says chicken can only be eaten if the bird’s throat has been slit while it 
is still alive’ (Jones, 2014). The story provides details about reciting verses from the Qur’an, facing 
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Mecca when making the cut, and the draining of blood from the animal. The Daily Mail sent an 
undercover reporter to a ‘halal’ abattoir who writes, ‘Grabbing one lamb at a time, he pulls back 
its head and slits the throat with a swift movement from his razor-sharp knife. Blood gushes 
everywhere as he recites the Islamic Bismillah prayer in Arabic: ‘In the name of Allah, the most 
gracious, the most merciful’’ (Penman, 2010). The ‘halal’ process is thus palpably shrouded in a 
veil of ritualistic strangeness replete with references to Allah, the spilling of innocent blood and 
the recital of prayers. The reporter’s preoccupation with these aspects of slaughter points to a 
sense of unease and simultaneously a morbid fascination with the practice. The undercover 
investigation which sought to uncover the ‘truth’ about the halal process only reveals its profound 
unfathomability. 
Coverage of this food production story was in sharp distinction to the horsemeat scandal 
the preceding year. In 2013, DNA testing revealed that many supposedly ‘beef’ products available 
in supermarkets in fact contained little or no cow, but instead up to 99% horse. The Sun’s front 
page on the horsemeat scandal took a light-hearted approach, joking that Findus lasagne consisted 
of ‘Shergar’ (the racehorse disappeared by suspected IRA operatives in 1983) and pasta. Most 
tabloid coverage consisted of noting the level of horsemeat contained within the food, and the 
‘household name’ stores stocking it, together with details of investigations underway. Major 
retailers including Tesco and Wal-Mart-owned Asda were selling ‘own-brand’ horsemeat lasagne 
wrongly labelled as ‘beef’. As the scandal unfolded, the narrative adopted – with active 
encouragement from the companies responsible for packaging horse as beef – was that the practice 
of substituting horse for cow was due to the involvement of ‘foreign’ factories in the production 
process. Retailers apologised and promised to switch or discipline suppliers to resolve the problem. 
 
The ideological functions of the ‘halal secret’ fantasy 
Both stories are unsettling in that they highlight increasing alienation from the processes 
of food production, the industrial slaughter of animals and the use of their flesh in ‘processed’ 
supermarket foods. However, whereas the horsemeat story is relatively light-hearted, with its 
Shergar joke (later Sun coverage noted that customers at a Mongolian restaurant were ‘neigh 
bothered’ about the sale of horsemeat), the coverage of the sale of Halal meat at Pizza Express is 
framed in a much more sinister way: a ‘HALAL SECRET’. This story is also explicitly linked to 
one the paper had run the previous week under the headline ‘200 Subways cutting out Ham for 
Muslims’, deepening the impression of a ‘plot’ or ‘conspiracy’ among UK food outlets to serve 
meat produced using halal slaughter methods ‘secretively’ to non-Muslims.  
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         The Pizza Express story tells readers that the chain has been serving only halal-slaughtered 
chicken, ‘without telling us’. This ‘us’ (non-Muslims) is therefore unwittingly eating meat from 
animals killed in accordance with the Islamic faith. This is supposed to be intrinsically outrageous. 
Yet outrage is only possible if we link this information up to the ideological network of other 
stories about Muslims. They are taking our ham away from our branches of Subway, they are 
radicalising our children at school, they are forming rape gangs and molesting white, non-Muslim 
British girls; these are all elements of the ‘Muslim plot’. In fact, as subsequent news coverage 
demonstrated, Pizza Express had trailed online their switch to halal-only chicken on grounds of 
cost effectiveness; it is cheaper to buy the meat in bulk, and hence all from one source (Muir, 
2014). Hugh Muir further notes that, unlike generic meat production, the standards of both care 
and hygiene are actually likely to be higher in many forms of religious slaughter, since at least some 
connection to the living animal and the meaning of its death is retained. 
The Pizza Express story, like the horsemeat story, speaks to societal anxiety about our 
meat industry and secretive industrial food production processes, hidden from sight in vast and 
remote factories across the world (Singer, 1975; Lymbery, 2015; Foer, 2011). Where meat comes 
from in contemporary Britain, with its reliance on mass-produced and ‘convenience’ food, is a 
source of anxiety (Blythman, 2015; Lawrence, 2013). The animal itself, its life and death, has been 
conceptualised in critical scholarship as the ‘absent referent’ of the meat production process (for 
example: Cudworth, 2010). In this instance, the spectre of the conceptual Muslim rears its 
monstrous head to cover the Real of our industrial meat production processes. That a majority of 
people might daily be consuming food of which they have little or no knowledge – of the country 
or even species of origin – is an intensely anxiety-inducing idea. The fantasy of a Muslim halal 
‘secret’ conspiracy provides a means of articulating and managing this anxiety. Lobbying for bans 
on halal meat on grounds of animal cruelty delays confrontation with the grotesqueries of 
contemporary industrial meat production.  
Conclusions  
This article provides a new frame through which to view media and political scandals 
surrounding Muslims in Britain. A series of highly publicised issues, including not only the ‘Muslim 
rape gangs’, ‘Trojan horse’ and ‘halal secret’ that form the focus of this paper, but also the building 
of mosques and the wearing of headscarves, have been articulated together in the popular 
imagination as a ‘Muslim plot’. We have shown that thinking this problem through the concepts 
of fantasy and anxiety enables us to better access the ideological functions of this ‘plot’ and its central 
imagined agent, the ‘conceptual Muslim’. The political labour which goes into ‘uncovering’ the 
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Muslim ‘plot’ functions to generate actionable anxieties, in order to complicate and block 
possibilities for wider social transformation. The spectral apparition of the conceptual Muslim 
occupies areas beyond obvious security concerns - food, child abuse and education - because these 
scandals point to multiple and intersecting systems of domination and oppression in British 
society. Through ideological fantasies about Muslims, confrontation with fundamental 
antagonisms of our social reality that are inadequately symbolised in our political-economic 
discourse – from poverty and inequality, to patriarchy, misogyny and anthroparchy – are 
indefinitely suspended. We need not confront ‘our’ antagonisms while we can still focus on ‘their’ 
disturbing excess and strange practices. This form of anxiety is necessary for politics to continue 
with ‘business as usual’; and in Britain this means as a racist, sexist, classed and anthroparchal 
order.  
Implications for social movements agitating for radical change are stark. Demands made 
by feminists, anti-racists, or socialists for more egalitarian societies can be disregarded, their aims 
de-legitimised, through the propagation of fantasies centred on the Muslim as a sexist, devious 
character stealthily taking over Britain. Multiculturalism is depicted as ‘weakness’, rendering Britain 
susceptible to the machinations of Muslims; anti-racist campaigners as ‘politically correct’ naive 
accomplices. Anti-racist struggles for gender equality are equally susceptible to such claims. 
Zevnik’s words are instructive here: ‘anxiety can also mobilise and support political action’ (2017: 
237); this includes support for measures targeting Muslims like so-called ‘burqa bans’ or banning 
halal meat. As Mandelbaum suggests, congruence between state, nation and society is the fantasy 
which underpins logics of security/insecurity, but we have shown here how fantasies of 
congruence can exceed security framings. Congruence fantasies provide ‘an explanation 
accounting for the lack of a promised future’ (Mandelbaum, 2016: 188), for why this future ‘cannot 
be attained’ (Zevnik, 2017: 240). British policy and media elites deploy the conceptual Muslim as 
means of avoiding uncomfortable truths about our society and - temporarily, at least - negating 
the possibility of its transformation. Anxieties about British Muslims are mobilised to manage the 
broader, unbearable anxiety of being in the UK today. 
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